We are seeking submissions in English for an edited volume on the topic “Husserl, Kant, and the Transcendental Phenomenology”
Editors: Iulian Apostolescu (University of Bucharest), Claudia Serban (Toulouse 2 Jean Jaurès University).
Transcendental phenomenology is not simply a theory about the structure of (inter)subjectivity, nor is it merely a discourse about how we understand and perceive the natural world and our sense-constitutive activities and passivities. It is not even a theory about how the world appears to us, if such a theory is supposed to be complemented by a further investigation (left to metaphysics) of what the world itself is like. Transcendental phenomenology aims to answer the following question: “in what way is the being of the world, the world, which is for me and could be for me, grounded in my intending, in my streaming experiencing and otherwise conscious life, and in my enduring features”? (Husserliana XXXIV: 244)
Despite of a long tradition of invocation and discussion of Husserl’s transcendental thinking, the deep meaning of the idea of a transcendental constitution of consciousness remains even today troublingly obscure.
We would like to take Husserl’s references seriously and reflect on the following topics:
- The Kantian and the Husserlian notion of the transcendental ego
- The relation of transcendental phenomenology to post-Kantian philosophies
- The idea of transcendental logic
- Husserl’s mature transcendental phenomenology
- Husserl’s notion of a world-annihilation
- The transcendental foundation of the natural sciences
- The distinction between the transcendental and the natural, the transcendental and the psychological, the transcendental and the anthropological
- Eugen Fink and the critique of transcendental reason
Title and abstract: 500 words, due February 28, 2017.
Final Paper Deadline: 7,000 -10,000 words, due January 15, 2018.
Date of publication will be Fall 2018.
Submit abstracts and papers to Claudia Serban [email@example.com] and Iulian Apostolescu [firstname.lastname@example.org].