The Subject(s) of Phenomenology. New Approaches to Husserl

Editors: Iulian Apostolescu (Bucharest); Philippe P. Haensler (Zürich); Vedran Grahovac (Guelph)
Language: English
Due dates for Proposals: 1st December 2015 (notification of acceptance by mid-January 2016); proposals (500 words) for papers of approximately 5000 words to be sent to all three editors.

What is phenomenology?”, M. Merleau-Ponty asks at the beginning of his Phenomenology of Perception – and he continues: “It may seem strange that this question has still to be asked half a century after the first works of Husserl. The fact remains, however, that it has by no means been answered.” Even today – more than half a century after Merleau-Ponty’s magnum opus – one cannot help but acknowledge the fact that the answer to this question is in many ways still up for grasp. While it may seem obvious that the main subject of phenomenology is, in fact, the subject it is far from clear what precisely this implies: Considering the immense variety of themes and analytical transformations found in Husserl’s corpus one has to take into account that ‘the’ subject of phenomenology inevitably points towards a plurality of possible subjects. This variety is reflected not only in the complexity of the developmental progression of Husserl’s thought – from its psychological beginnings to its transcendental re-interpretation and, last but not least, to its ‘proto-deconstruction’ in the late manuscripts – but also in the methodological intersection and mutual re-articulation of the different stages in Husserl’s work.

Furthermore, one observes that many of the major philosophical figures and streams in the 20th and 21st century tried to outline and fortify their own positions apropos very specific – more often than not: rather eclectic – interpretations of Husserl’s (?) phenomenology and its concept of subjectivity. Thus it may come as no surprise that many attempts to programmatically ‘follow’ Husserl’s philosophy (R. Ingarden, A. Reinach, E. Stein) involuntarily found themselves in radical disagreement with the founder of the phenomenological movement; conversely many explicit rejections of Husserlian thought (M. Heidegger, M. Merleau-Ponty, E. Levinas) unintentionally turned out to be a continuation, even enrichment of Husserl’s phenomenology.

In this light the volume invites established scholars and PhD students alike to critically re-evaluate the dominant interpretations of Husserl’s philosophy and its various successors and to explore anew what phenomenology actually is and can possibly be about. While the thematic direction of the volume is deliberately kept broad paper proposals should fit into one of the following three categories:
a) The Phenomenological Project: Definition and Scope
The first section of the book deals with the origins and the (psychological, neo-kantian etc.) backdrops of phenomenological method. The section also aims at opening up a space for indepth reflection upon the significance of Husserl’s response to his early critics and students, and the importance of this exchange for the further development of the phenomenological project.
b) The Unfolding of Phenomenological Philosophy
The second section encourages authors to engage afresh with the mid to late stages of Husserl’s work and to explore new interpretative avenues regarding the ‘central’ turn towards the problem of transcendental subjectivity.
c) At the Limits of Phenomenology: Towards Phenomenology as a Philosophy of Limits
The third section aims at a careful re-examination of the possibilities and limitations of Husserl’s method and project, esp. through the lens of other philosophers / other strains of philosophy. Additionally, the section strongly encourages essays on the relationship between phenomenology and non-philosophical disciplines, i.e. on subjects of phenomenological research beyond the subject.

https://www.academia.edu/16276179/CfP_The_Subject_s_of_Phenomenology._New_Approaches_to_Husserl